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Abstract
Stochastic DEA constructs production frontiers that incorporate both inefficiency and
stochastic error. This results in a closer envelopment of the mean performance of the companies
in the sample and diminishes the effect of extreme outliers. We use the Land, Lovell and Thore
(1993) model incorporating information on the covariance structure of inputs and outputs to study
efficiency across a panel of 17 European airlines in the 1990s during the early phase of
liberalisation. After allowing for stochastic error in computing the relative efficiencies we
conclude that the airlines that were efficient in 1995 resembled those that were efficient in 1993
but not those in 1991. The airlines that were efficient in 1995 were the larger companies.
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21. Introduction
Why are we interested in the efficiency and productivity analysis of a particular
industry? There are often two objectives in the mind of researchers when important
policy changes have occurred. The first is to evaluate the effects of the policy change and
for this we look for sharp differences in the performance of companies depending on the
extent to which they have responded. The second objective is to provide the closest
envelopment of the observed data, and for this purpose a wide range of Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) models have been
developed. The dilemma of model choice depends on the trade off between minimal
specification which favours DEA and allowing for stochastic error in measuring company
efficiency which favours SFA.
In the past few years the theoretical papers of Land, Lovell and Thore (1993) (LLT)
and Olesen and Petersen (1995) (OP) have offered the interesting prospect of stochastic
data envelopment analysis SDEA. This can be interpreted as a way of allowing for
stochastic error in the standard DEA model. One objective of this paper is to apply this
approach to the study of the liberalisation of the European airline industry over the period
1991-5. In particular we explore the LLT model which treats the constraints in an
envelopment form of DEA as subject to chance.  The second objective of the paper is to
determine whether the measured effects of airline market liberalisation have resulted in
efficiency changes both in level and dispersion for the companies involved. When all of
the observations are treated as deterministic so that all variation is attributed to relative
inefficiency it is easy to overstate the effect of policy changes in the short term.
Consequently we expect that the SDEA model, if it can be successfully applied will
3reduce the clarity of the policy conclusions. The question is whether any strong
conclusions will remain about the effect of the liberalisation after we provide the closer
envelopment of the data that goes with the SDEA model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the policy background
while section 3 reviews other non-parametric airline studies. Section 4 describes the
SDEA model and its implementation and also provides an interpretation. Section 5
describes the data to be used and section 6 summarises the empirical results. Section 7
concludes.
2. The Evolution of Regulatory Policy in the Europe airlines industry
The regulation of international aviation was initiated with the Paris convention of
1919. It was accepted that states have sovereignty rights over the air space above their
territory. This directly involved national governments in the regulation of the industry.
Control was mainly handled with a set of ad hoc arrangements between nations. The
rules on certain economic rights, however, were not set till the 1944 Chicago Conference.
The Conference, involving fifty-two nations, was organised to discuss the possibility
of establishing a multilateral agreement in order to develop international air services.
Mainly this agreement aimed to deal with three aspects of international transport: the
exchange of traffic rights, or ‘freedoms of the air’; the control of tariffs; and the control
of frequencies and capacities (Doganis, 1991:26). The participant nations were only able
to reach agreement in the first two freedoms and no multilateral agreement was reached
on the other freedoms.
4Over the years, bilateral air services agreements have emerged to regulate all
essential elements related to the exchange of air services between nations. Most bilateral
agreements involved only the national carriers, from the individual states. The Bermuda
agreement signed between the UK and the US in 1946 became a model for many other
bilateral agreements. In particular, an agreement would determine the load capacity and
frequencies. With restrictive ‘pooling agreements’, the individual states could share the
capacity and the revenue earned from those routes. This led to a regulated duopoly where
the participants were usually the government owned national carriers. The governments
strictly controlled entry into the industry by refusing to licence competitors. Secured with
such agreements, the interests of “flag” carriers were always protected. As a result,
competition was eliminated.
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which aimed to establish economic integration in the
European Community, the position of air transport was not clear. Whilst Article 3 of the
Treaty applied to road, rail and inland waterways, the air and sea transport were
exempted from the competition rules of the Treaty until a Community-wide policy could
be developed. A considerable pressure for the liberalisation in European aviation came
from the European Commission (EC) to direct the extent to which regulatory policy has
been relaxed in Europe. The EC is the largest international body in European aviation
whose attitudes towards liberalisation have significant implications not only for the EC
members but the other states as well. Indeed, the increasing number of liberalised
bilateral agreements between the EC airlines and other European carriers necessitated
changes in the ongoing system to create a multilateral liberalisation, thus provide an
important stimulus towards a freer market within the EC.
5The EC had suggested reforms in 1972 to open aviation to competition, but a
decisive push to liberalise air transport in the European Union came with the experience
of deregulation in the US domestic airlines, signing of the single European Act and the
‘Nouvelles Frontieres’ case in 1986. This resulted in three ‘liberalisation packages’ that
were agreed in December 1987, June 1990 and July 1992.
The First Liberalisation Package of measures provided for limited freedom to
compete on cheap fares, but offered multiple designation on the busier routes, and less
restrictive capacity sharing agreements, which entitled either country to operate up to
60% of capacity (Vincent and Stasinopoulus, 1990).
The Second Package of reforms allowed more flexible conditions on setting fares
and improving market access. Deep discount fares, for example, were introduced without
requiring government approval. The lower limit was reduced from 45% in the 1987
package to 30% of the reference economy fare. Restrictions imposed on capacity shares
were gradually removed and aimed to be fully eliminated by January 1993 – the date of
the Single Market for European aviation (Stasi opoulos, 1992).
Integrating aviation within the overall framework of the EC policies for the Single
Market forced the EC to agree the Third Liberalisation Package with more drastic
measures. It was aimed to create a more competitive environment for European aviation.
Airlines could set their own tariffs freely, subject to the safeguards against the predatory
pricing or excessive prices. The opening of access to all intra-Community routes, i.e. the
cabotage rights, will be gradual and completed in 1997. With respect to licensing there
will not be any discrimination in favour of flag carriers. Any technically and financially
6sound Community airline can obtain license and fly on any EC route (Stasinopoulos,
1993).
It had taken so long to bring European countries to reach a consensus on a
multilateral agreement. However, triple package of measures to liberalise the market
gradually were aimed to achieve this purpose. January 1993 witnessed the emergence of
open skies within Europe after the legislators of the EU applied the principles of a single
market to the airlines industry even though it had been indeed difficult to eliminate the
conflicts of interest in an industry traditionally entrenched in national interest with the
vast majority of carriers state-owned.
3. Literature Survey: Non-parametric Airlines Applications
This section reviews four studies where the nonparametric strength of DEA is used
to measure the efficiency and productivity of the airlines industry. Schefczyk (1993)
presented a model to measure operational performance for airlines. The inputs were
available tonne kilometre (ATK), operating cost, and non-flight assets. The outputs were
revenue passenger kilometre (RPK) and non-passenger revenue. Based on this model,
DEA was used to analyse the performance of fifteen large international airlines for the
year, 1990.
Four airlines, Cathay Pacific, Federal Express, Singapore Airlines and UAL
Corporation appeared the most efficient airlines with 100% efficiency scores. All four
European airlines in the sample, British Airways, Iberia, KLM and Lufthansa were
inefficient, with the efficiency scores less than 100%. Schefczyk continued his analysis
7with regression analysis to determine the relationship between these efficiency scores and
some strategic variables, e.g. profitability, focus of the airline, revenue growth or load
factors. The findings implied that the efficient, well-utilised and passenger-focused
airline was most likely to be profitable.
Distexhe and Perelman (1994) aimed to evaluate the consequences of deregulation
by measuring the airlines’ technical efficiency and productivity growth over the period
1977 to 1988. The sample was composed of thirty-three airlines operating in scheduled
international markets in three groups: Asia and Oceania, Europe and North America.
DEA was used to construct several production frontiers of airline activities. Then, they
followed the approach by Färe, Grosskopf, and Roos (1992) to estimate the Malmquist
productivity index and decompose this index into technological progress or efficiency
change. The production technology was defined with two inputs and one output. The
inputs were labour and capital. L bour was measured in terms of the number of flying
personnel and capital was by total available aircraft capacity weighted by the number of
days. The output was available tonn kilometre, in freight and passenger services.
The results suggested that, regardless of the method used, the average levels of
technical efficiency in the eighties were higher than those obtained in the seventies. The
European carriers, on average, were technically less efficient than the other carriers in the
sample. Among the European carriers, Lufthansa, KLM and Air France recorded high
efficiency scores, whereas British Airways, Alit lia and Swissair could not achieve more
than 80% efficiency level. The results for small carriers improved when the two
characteristics were taken into account, e.g. Finnair and Aer Lingus recorded higher
efficiency scores. The results obtained by the Malmquist indices of productivity were
8similar to the findings achieved by DEA. Lufthansa, Finnair and Air France obtained the
best results along with the Japan Airlines, Singapore Airlines, American and TWA. North
American and European airlines obtained low scores during the period 1980-1982 due to
the impact of the second oil crisis. “The Asia and Oceania” group achieved best scores in
all periods due to their ability to gain from technological process.
In the study by Good, Nadiri, Roeller, and Sickles (1995) efficiency and productivity
differentials between European and US carriers are identified. The authors used two
alternative methodologies – a parametric one using statistical estimation, and a
nonparametric one using a linear programming technique. Moreover, the firm-specific
and time-dependent efficiency and productivity differences were used to rank carriers
through time. Finally, they simulated the potential benefits that could be achieved were
the airlines operated under less regulated environments. The data set covered the period
of 1976-1986 and consisted of a panel data of the eight largest European carriers and the
eight largest American airlines. A set of three airline inputs was constructed in a similar
way as in the previously review studies. Additionally, three characteristics of airline
output and two characteristics of the capital stock were calculated. These were load
factor, stage length, a measure of network size, the percent of the fleet (wide-bodied), the
percent of the fleet (turboprop propulsion).
The results of this study showed that the US carriers were around 15-20% relatively
more efficient. This was also confirmed with the lower productivity growth of European.
However, allocative inefficiencies were present in both European carriers, with most of
the inefficiency coming from over-utilisation of materials with less capital. Among the
European carriers, only Lufthansa and British Airways showed positive trends in their
9efficiency scores. The authors suggested that the institutional and organisational
developments in these companies were the primary reasons of their success. Moreover, it
was calculated that European carriers would save approximately $4 billion per year (in
1986 dollars) if they became productively efficient as the US carriers, which operated
under deregulation.
Fethi (2000) investigated the performance of European airlines industry for a panel
data set of 17 airlines European airlines over the period of 1991-1995. Three
methodologies were used in this study: DEA, Tobit analysis, and DEA based Malmquist
productivity index. The technical efficiency of individual airlines was examined using the
non-parametric frontier methodology, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). To
investigate the determinants of efficiency, Tobit model was used. This analysis aimed to
explain the variation in calculated efficiencies to a set of explanatory variables, i.e.
impact of concentration, ownership, degree of specialisation, average stage length, route
network density, load factor, effects of liberalisation. The variable selection procedure
was similar to Schefczyk (1993).
The empirical findings confirmed the detrimental effects of concentration and
subsidy policies on individual efficiencies. The state ownership however, did not provide
an impediment for being efficient in this sample. Further, the findings suggested that in
order to remain competitive and efficient, the European airlines needed to maintain their
service quality – increase the load factors.
The DEA based Malmquist productivity index results indicated that the airlines
experience productivity growth in only one period (1993-94) which stemmed from the
increase in technical efficiencies. The remaining periods (1991-92 and 1994-95)
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exhibited productivity decline which could be explained by a deterioration of the
performance of best practice airlines, whereas in 1992-93, the decline occurs due to the
divergence from best practices on the part of the remaining airlines. Small airlines (i.e.
Aer Lingus, Air Malta, Cyprus Airways and Icelandair) experienced negative growth
rates within the study period whereas some larger airlines (i.e. Air France, Alitalia,
Austrian Airlines, British Airways, Iberia and Air Portugal) experienced positive average
annual growth rates.
4. Stochastic DEA: Theory and Model
The procedure for DEA measurement of input based technical efficiency is well
known. We take each firm in turn and compare it with the reference set of the whole
industry. This is represented by the input requirements set for a given level of outputs,
which is bounded below by the isoquant. The object here is to find the largest reduction
in the firm’s actual input usage which will allow it to remain in the input requirements
set, i.e. achieve a position on the efficient frontier isoquant determined by the
observations on the industry as a whole.
Doing this for each firm in turn we identify the firm’s q value. This is the firm’s
Farrell efficiency: 10 ££ q . Values of q = 1 indicate that the firm is already one of those
which defines the frontier and is 100 per cent efficient. The firm’s inefficiency is
( ) %1001 ´-q . In what follows it is necessary to examine particular output and input
constraints which can be written in terms of s outputs:  njsryrj KK 1,1, == and m
inputs: njmixij KK 1,1, ==  for the n different producing units (airlines). The input
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requirement set is defined by the following inequalities for each producing unit in turn.
The producing unit under observation is subscripted ‘0’ to distinguish it from all of the
producing units together: nj K1=
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We now return to the chance constrained DEA problem described by LLT (1993).
This allows the constraints to hold with probability level ( )1,0Îa  i.e. with less than
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Charnes and Cooper (1963) show how to use the idea of a modified certainty
equivalent to transform this stochastic linear programming problem into a deterministic
non-linear programming problem.  The difference between the firm’s output and the
reference weighted outputs of all the firms is treated as a random variable. The difference
between the firm’s input adjusted for its efficiency and the reference weighted inputs of
all the firms in the industry is also treated as a random variable.
We begin with the constraints relating to the outputs, and re-write them as below. In
these steps we assume that the random variable has a finite positive variance so that the
standard deviation: 
2
1
var ÷
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è
æ -¢ ror yly  can be used as a divisor
Now assume the random variable representing the output shortfall is normally
distributed:
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Using ( )zF to represent the cumulative distribution function of the standard normally
distributed variable we write the standard normal deviate as )(1 a-F=z for given a .
Consequently
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This completes the transformation of the probabilistic version of the linear output
constraint into a deterministic non-linear form using what Charnes nd Cooper (1963)
refer to as a modified certainty equivalent. It is useful to write it in a slightly more
general form as follows.
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Turning now to the input constraints, these are initially expressed as:
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Proceeding as before we therefore write:
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This completes the transformation as in the output case, but again we can write the
transformed non-linear constraint in a slightly more general form:
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We are now in a position to implement stochastic DEA as a deterministic non-linear
programming problem.
For clarity of setting up the model, LLT (1993) suggest that the problem can be
restated in non-matrix terms.  Using Z1-a to denote the critical value of z fr m the
standard normal tables, we have for the mean performance case:
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In this restatement:
0for,1and0,1for, =-=¹== jjnj jjjj lmlm K
and
0for,and0,1for, =-=¹== jjnj jjjj qlnln K
This is a non-linear programming problem in the variables: q, lj, mj and nj. Specifically
it has a linear objective and (s + m) quadratic inequality constraints with additional
restrictions on the variables to ensure positive variance terms. The re-statement of the
realisation case is proceeded analogously and is shown in Lovell (1993, p. 34-5)
To implement this programme we have used the algorithm  of Lasdon et al (1978)
which is widely available in many spreadsheet and symbolic programming applications,
see Kendrick (1996).
What is the intuition behind SDEA? LLT provide one form of insight using the density
function of the random error, but we can also borrow another diagrammatic intuition
from the paper by Olsen and Petersen (1995). This is shown in figure 1 below.
In this diagram we illustrate observations on a panel of producing or decision making
units (DMUs 1 –3) for the case of two inputs and one output. The boundary of the input
requirements set is defined by the isoquant. In deterministic DEA the individually most
efficient realisations define the frontier shown by the solid line. However, in
implementing SDEA we are in effect looking for confidence regions around each
producing unit’s observations within the panel. These are shown as grouped within the
ellipses shown around sets of observations. Olese  and Petersen describe the SDEA
frontier as being evaluated relative to the centre of these confidence regions. As a
16
consequence, the SDEA frontier associates extreme outliers with the stochastic error term
and this has the effect of moving the frontier closer to the bulk of the producing units.
Some realisations will then lie above the frontier and in evaluating the realisation model
these observations will have a super-efficiency larger than unity.
Figure 1 SDEA and DEA frontiers
In the diagram the DEA frontier passes through the most extreme observations of the
three DMUs 1, 2, and 3, while the SDEA frontier passes through the centre of the
confidence regions around the observations for these DMUs. W  can see that particular
x1
x2
DMU 1
DMU 2
DMU 3
O
A
B
B*
DEA frontier
SDEA frontier
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observations will have  SDEA efficiency larger than unity. The observation at A has two
efficiency scores: OB/OA for the DEA frontier and OB*/OA for the SDEA frontier. The
SDEA score will usually be greater but never lower than the DEA efficiency score. The
distance between the two frontiers represents the role of the stochastic error term in
accounting for the variation in production performance. The larger is the variance of the
sample, the larger will be the confidence ranges for the data and therefore the greater will
be the distance between DEA and SDEA frontiers. In other words a sample with a wide
variation in inputs and outputs observed for each unit will ascribe more of the variation in
performance to the stochastic error than a sample with a narrow variation over the panel.
In some cases we may find that a widely varying panel has two properties:
The mean performance of the units clusters around unity (100 percent efficiency)
because the SDEA frontier has shifted so far towards the units which lie below the DEA
frontier, and the extreme performance or individual realisation of some of the most
successful observations lies well in excess of 100 percent. Such results would indicate
that the sample contained a very large degree of measurement error and other stochastic
influences, and consequently only the mean performance frontier is of relevance in using
the results for such purposes as yardstick competition.
5. Data
The panel data consists of annual observations on 17 airlines over the period of 1991
and 1995. The names of the airlines and their countries of origin are as follows: Aer
Lingus (Ireland), Air France (France), Air Malta (Malta), Alitalia (Italy), Austrian
Airways (Austria), British Airways (United Kingdom), Cyprus Airways (Cyprus), Finnair
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(Finland), Iberia (Spain), Icelandair (Iceland), KLM (The Netherlands), Lufthansa
(Germany), Sabena (Belgium), SAS (Scandinavia), Swissair (Switzerland), Air Portugal
(Portugal) and Turkish Airlines (Turkey). A relatively short time frame is used for the
panel because we do not wish to confuse the policy effects with the secular trend of
technological change. We argue that by concentrating on the years 1991-95 we are able
to capture the immediate short term effects of liberalisation without picking up major
technological shifts in the industry.
Except for the two privately owned airlines, British Airways and Icelandair, the airlines
in the sample are ‘flag’ carriers with varying degrees of state ownership. Because there
would be many non-Community national ‘flag’ carriers which are also affected by the
recent reforms, our sample considers the members of the AEA in which all Community
member airlines are included alongside the non-Community ones. Because of data
limitations, Adrian, Balkan, British Midland, Czech Airlines, Yugoslav, Lux ir, Malev
and Olympic Airways are excluded from the sample.
To specify the inputs and outputs, the model by Schefczyk (1993) is adopted. Each of the
inputs and outputs in the model reflects the operational characteristics of the airline industry.
The inputs are available tonne kilometre (ATK); operating cost; and non-flight assets. The
two outputs are revenue passenger kilometre (RPK) and non-passenger revenue. ATK is for
the aircraft capacity obtained to include both passenger and non-passenger inputs. Operating
cost is obtained by excluding the capital and aircraft costs already reflected in ATK and
non-flight assets are included to reflect all assets not already reflected by ATK. These assets
are mainly the reservation systems, hotels and other facilities. RPK is used as a proxy for the
passenger-flight related output whereas non-passenger revenue reflects all other output that
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is not passenger-flight related, such as cargo. For all monetary conversions, purchasing
power parities by OECD are used.
The data are based on three sources. ATK and RPK are obtained from International Air
Transport Association (IATA) World Air Transport Statistics; non-flight assets are from the
annual reports of the companies and the rest is from the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) Financial Data Series. The rapid growth of the European airlines is
apparent from Table 1, which displays the summary statistics of the data set. There is an
increase in the aircraft capacity obtained. Operating costs, however, decrease in the year
1995. Non-flight assets also show a fall in 1994, but reveal a sharp increase in the final year.
There is an increasing trend in the passenger revenues whereas non-passenger revenues
decrease in the final year. The last feature of the data is that there are enormous variations
among the airlines in the sample, which is evidenced by large deviations of the variables.
This is because there are very small and very large airlines in the sample.
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for European airlines, 1991-1995
ATK OC NFA RPK NPA
1991
Mean 3977.4 2260.7 1442.1 16442.4 690.3
Standard deviation 4348.3 2181.8 1185.3 17189.3 690.5
Minimum 131.2 48.6 12.2 1284.2 19.3
Maximum 13005.6 6848.8 3427.4 63190.5 2502.0
1992
Mean 4382.6 2526.1 1592.8 20375.7 752.9
Standard deviation 4778.3 2557.0 1326.5 21995.6 842.9
Minimum 267.9 51.1 27.3 1284.2 20.5
Maximum 14371.5 7926.3 3801.8 80265.4 2959.9
1993
Mean 4730.9 2649.8 1698.8 20359.2 766.6
Standard deviation 5228.7 2631.7 1438.7 22008.2 864.3
Minimum 192.3 54.3 25.1 1284.2 21.7
Maximum 15869.1 8224.5 4590.3 80265.4 2941.9
1994
Mean 5024.6 2816.6 1598.8 21925.1 840.3
Standard deviation 5546.0 2925.7 1312.4 23944.9 988.4
Minimum 417.8 65.9 24.8 2361.1 21.0
Maximum 16989.4 9239.9 3800.5 86395.4 3478.8
1995
Mean 5384.0 2554.8 2873.2 23575.4 658.5
Standard deviation 5945.5 2574.1 6491.9 25540.1 638.3
Minimum 444.7 71.7 29.8 2555.5 23.9
Maximum 18456.1 9638.827781.9 94002.6 2481.6
Notes: ATK; available tonne kilometre; OC; operating cost; NFA; non-flight assets;
RPK ; revenue passenger kilometre; NPA; non-passenger revenue.
6. Empirical results
In order to implement the SDEA model for our panel of 17 European airlines for the
years 1991-95 we have calculated both mean performance and annual realisation versions
of the model. There are two purposes in writing this paper. One is to consider the effect
of using chance constraints rather than deterministic constraints on a well established
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DEA efficiency analysis. The effect of using chance constraints is possibly more clear
when attention is concentrated on the mean performance. The other purpose is to consider
whether the measurement of the efficiency effects of liberalising the airlines is sensitive
to the assumptions of stochastic errors in the data. The liberalisation effects can be seen
more clearly in looking at the performance of individual annual realisations.
Beginning with the mean performance results, we examined a number of different
cases. To analyse the effect of changing the probability of violating the constraints, the
model was implemented for each of the airlines using two different a levels, where a is
the upper limit on the probability that the constraints are satisfied. Remember that in this
formulation, a represents the probability weight attached to the variance of the output or
input slack in the envelopment constraints. As  falls toward its lower limit of 0.5 the
variance term becomes less important and the model approaches the deterministic DEA
version.
We also then considered whether there could be a difference in the way that
stochastic factors affected the output and input constraints. The original paper by Land,
Lovell and Thore (1993) provides different reasoning for the assumption of chance
constraints depending on whether outputs or inputs are being considered. Consequently
the model was also implemented for each of the airlines with, first, all constraints
stochastic and then with only input constraints stochastic and finally with only output
constraints stochastic. This gives a six-fold classification of results for the mean
performance of the panel. We can add for comparison the deterministic DEA results for
the mean performances of the airlines in the sample. The results are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2.  Average efficiency in different models
Average efficiency (standard
deviation) in model
Probability level a = 0.95Probability level a = 0.8
All constraints stochastic 1 (0) 1 (0)
Input constraints stochastic 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.03)
Output constraints stochastic0.98 (0.06) 0.98 (0.06)
Deterministic DEA (a = 1) 0.95 (0.07) 0.95 (0.07)
These results are exactly in line with the theoretical predictions of the LLT model.
Compared with the deterministic DEA results the average efficiency performance is
much better. Indeed in the case where all constraints are stochastic the amount of
variation in the data is such that all of the perceived inefficiencies can be attributed to
stochastic error. In the case where input constraints are stochastic and output constraints
are deterministic which implies measurement error only for inputs the drop in average
efficiency is negligible. A larger drop in average efficiency with a greater standard
deviation of performance is recorded in the case where output constraints are treated as
stochastic and the input constraints are treated as deterministic. Our interpretation of
these results is that the findings are ambiguous. On the one hand, allowing for
measurement error in inputs removes virtually all of the perceived inefficiency in the
mean performances of the airlines. The deterministic DEA results therefore could be
reflecting differences in the way that inputs are recorded or measured. On the other hand
allowing for measurement error only in outputs still leaves a degree of inefficiency in the
industry. It is the unexplained variability of input usage that is reflected in the airlines
relative performance.
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The individual irlines which are inefficient in the mean performance case are shown
next in Table 3.
Table 3.  Technically inefficient airlines
Inefficient airlines Probability level a = 0.95 Probability level a = 0.8
Input constraints stochasticBritish Airways Air Malta, British Airways,
Sabena
Output constraints stochasticSabena Iberia, Sabena
As the model allows more of the outliers to reflect inefficiency rather than stochastic
error (a takes a lower value) the number of inefficient companies rises. Although one
company Sabena is inefficient in both versions, the other remaining inefficient companies
differ according to whether it is the input constraints or the output constrain s which are
allowed to be stochastic. This may reflect inefficiency in input choice in the case of
British Airways and Air Malta, and output uncertainty in the case of Iberia. We can ask
whether these inefficient companies share common characteristics. Among the airlines
we have distinguished two major characteristics of interest to the liberalisation issue: size
and ownership.
Table 4 classifies the airlines in the sample by the size of the fleet and the percentage
of state ownership in 1995. It is apparent that Sabena are both heavily state owned and
small airlines, whereas British Airways is at the opposite extreme, a large privately
owned airline. The conclusion that is emerging from this mean performance data is that
by 1995 it was much too soon to conclude that the liberalisation process had succeeded in
greatly improving the efficiency of the privately owned airlines relative to the state
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owned airlines. The time required for policy to work is clearly longer than had been
anticipated and the degree of liberalisation implemented may be far short of that required.
Table 4.  Size and ownership of airlines in 1995
Airline No. of aircraft in fleet State ownership %
Aer Lingus 38 100
Air France 230 99.3
Air Malta 11 96.4
Alitalia 158 86.4
Austrian 35 51.9
British Airways 309 0
Cyprus Airways 9 80.5
Finnair 57 60.7
Iberia 160 99.8
Iceland Air 15 0
KLM 125 38.2
Lufthansa 327 35.7
Sabena 85 61.8
SAS 203 50
Swissair 75 21
Air Portugal 34 100
Turkish Airlines 73 98.2
We turn now to consider the realisations for different years of the sample. As
expected in the model, several individual airline real sations have efficiency scores in
excess of unity. However although the LLT model suggests these should be rare
occurrences, the results suggest that such observations are relatively frequent. This
suggests again that when we allow for the variance of the data, the model does have
difficulty in identifying inefficient airlines. The volatility of the results is emphasi ed by
the  performance ranking for the SDEA efficiency scores shown in Table 5, where we
have chosen three representative years from the beginning, middle end of the end of the
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sample period. It is apparent that the different companies change efficiency ranking
position quite significantly in the period under observation. For example, each of the
companies which s designated most efficient in one year is much further down the table
towards the least efficient in another year.
The correlations between the rankings and between the post-liberalisation realised
stochastic efficiencies and size and ownership are shown in Table 6. Again the major
impression is that data volatility is making it difficult to arrive at firm results. Two
conclusions are possible. After allowing for stochastic error in computing the relative
efficiencies we conclude:
§ The airlines that were efficient in 1995 resembled those that were efficient
in 1993 but not those in 1991
§ The airlines that were efficient in 1995 were the larger companies
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Table 5.  SDEA efficiency rankings 1991-5
Ranking of SDEA efficiency scores 1991 1993 1995
Aer Lingus 6 2 11
Air France 2 4 14
Air Malta 17 12 15
Alitalia 13 1 7
Austrian 3 15 10
British Airways 5 9 1
Cyprus Airways 16 13 16
Finnair 11 3 9
Iberia 15 11 8
Iceland Air 4 13 17
KLM 12 8 5
Lufthansa 10 6 2
Sabena 8 17 13
SAS 7 10 6
Swissair 14 5 3
Air Portugal 9 7 4
Turkish Airlines 1 16 12
Table 6.  Efficiency score correlations
Rank
correlations
for SDEA
models
Efficiency in
1991 &
1993
Efficiency in
1993 &
1995
Efficiency in
1991 &
1995
Efficiency in
1995 and
size
Efficiency in
1995 and
ownership
-0.178 0.416 -0.105 0.600 -0.299
What can we conclude from the SDEA realisation results? It is certainly not possible
to determine a strong liberalisation effect on technical efficiency. There is some stability
in the set of efficient companies towards the end of the sample period, but these efficient
companies are generally the largest rather than those that have been privatised. More
generally, it is clear that allowing for stochastic errors in DEA efficiency measurement
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reduces the researcher’s ability to make strong comparisons. SDEA does allow us to
incorporate stochastic error into non-parametric multiple output and multiple input
efficiency studies. In doing so it offers a closer envelopment of the observed data which
is a primary objective of the efficiency and productivity analysis research. However this
closer envelopment is obtained at the cost of reduced attribution of efficiency differences
which is another objective of the research.
7. Conclusion
The European airlines industry is undergoing a stage of critical restructuring. The
reform packages were introduced in an effort to put pressure on governments to create a
more competitive environment. The Third Liberalisation package, which was in effect
from January 1993, has been regarded as a serious step into substantial liberalised Europe
aviation.
Similar with the expectations from the US experience, a strongly held view is that
liberalisation reforms will bring a significant dimension in providing the forces of a truly
competitive market that real competition can thrive. Further, this could lower prices and
increase consumer benefits, thus enhance productivity in the industry.
Indeed, it is important to learn from the lessons of US experience. Adopting fully the
US style deregulation is unlikely for Europe since there are many individual states along
with various institutions that have interests in the way liberalisation policy evolves.
However, it is expected from all parties to put more effort to establish a l ng term
structure for European airlines which is facing pressures from recent globalisation trends.
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One of the lessons of US deregulation showed an increase in mergers and alliances.
It is imperative to consider the likely effects of a similar concentration in European
aviation whilst creating a more competitive market. Additionally, it is vital to consider
the future effects of state ownership, subsidies and the infrastructure constraints on the
productivity of the industry.
As a matter of fact, the European airlines industry during its early phase of
liberalisation process provides a fascinating case study, which prompts us to carry out a
comparative performance analysis. In this paper we have pursued two objectives. The
first is to implement one of the stochastic DEA models in the existing literature. In doing
this we have largely confirmed the predictions of the model in providing a closer
envelopment of the data and identifying super efficient realisations. However one of the
consequences of allowing for stochastic error in the efficiency and productivity analysis
is that in achieving a closer envelopment we have fewer strong conclusions to offer about
measured efficiency.
This reflects on our second objective of measuring the efficiency consequences of
the liberalisation programme. It is apparent that the volatility of the data on the input and
output performance of the European airlines makes it very difficult to come to firm
conclusions about the short term efficiency effects of the liberalisation package. Using
the stochastic models developed here we are unable to find a strong effect from
ownership to technical efficiency in the time frame considered. There is however a
relationship between inefficiency and smallness of fleet size so that further work on scale
effects in the SDEA model is required. We suggest that the SDEA approach is fruitful
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and certainly should be used in conjunction with conventional deterministic DEA, but
clearly much work remains to be done on the foundations of this approach.
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